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Authoritarian states have always sought to control information and manipulate the message. 
Historically, they relied on the blunt instruments of censorship and propaganda. Modern 
authoritarians still imprison journalists and close down newspapers, but they have also found 
more sophisticated ways to suppress criticism and skew narratives in their favour. Governments 
still need to control information at home, but they are also engaged in an information battle 
internationally. They use Western PR companies, government-backed NGOs and think-tanks, 
pliant or supportive academics and politicians, and interventions on social media to suppress 
critics and legitimise their regimes. 
  
Russia has been most active in the information battle, and its goals and aims are far more 
ambitious than many other post-Soviet states. President Putin has called on staff in 
government-funded Russian media to “break the monopoly of the Anglo-Saxon media.”[1] 
Journalists are seen to be on the frontline of an ‘information war’, part of a broader pattern of 
geopolitical competition. The Russian government has funded an array of news agencies and 
NGOs that promote a Kremlin-funded line. The news agency Sputnik, launched in 2014, was 
designed, according to its head Dmitry Kiselev, to fight ‘against aggressive propaganda that is 
now being fed to the world and which forces a unipolar construction of the world’.[2] 
Information takes a prominent place in Russia’s National Security Strategy, in which Moscow 
outlines a struggle for global dominance, in which ‘information mechanisms’ play a central 
role.[3] 
 Other authoritarian states in Eurasia use some of Russia’s templates for controlling 
information and promoting alternative narratives, but they are less concerned with global 
geopolitics and more worried about defending their own regimes from domestic and 
international criticism. Across Eurasia, nervous autocrats have cracked down hard on 
independent journalists, bloggers and media outlets over the last decade. Freedom House rates 
10 of the 13 post-Soviet republics as ‘not free’ in terms of their media.[4] But it’s not just about 
censorship and repression. The smarter authoritarians understand the need to repackage official 
narratives in popular formats. News programmes aim for Western-style production values, and 
use discussion shows and talking heads. Only the most repressive states, such as Turkmenistan, 
still favour dreary, Soviet-style propaganda. 
 Internationally, this mimicry of genre is even more important. States use public relations 
experts to dress up their government narrative in language that will appeal to a Western 
audience. The Kazakh government has hired a string of public relations and strategic 
consultancy companies, including Portland Communications, Tony Blair Associates, BGR 
Gabara and Media Consulta, to promote its own narrative of economic progress and political 
stability and downplay criticism of its human rights record and lack of democratic progress.[5] 
PR companies place op-eds in leading Western newspapers, lobby parliamentarians and aim to 
influence government policies. Azerbaijan has also been an active user of Western PR 
companies, with ARCO, CSM Strategic and Burson Marsteller all reported to have signed 
contracts with the regime, despite the rapid worsening of government repression against 
political opponents in recent years.[6] 
 One variation on the role of PR companies has been the use of private intelligence companies 
and legal consultancies. Arcanum, a Zurich-based company controlled by the US holding 
company RJI Capital Group, is a private intelligence group that employs many former senior 
intelligence officials as its consultants. According to opposition Kazakh newspapers, citing 
leaked emails, the Kazakh government employed Arcanum on a multi-million dollar contract 
as part of its campaign against exiled banker Mukhtyar Ablyazov.[7] Although it does not name 
its client, Arcanum outlines this type of contract on its website: ‘Arcanum has been retained in 
a major political dispute between a sovereign government and its political foes. Arcanum’s 
investigations have resulted in the tracing of illegal assets worth billions of dollars by one of 
our clients’ opponents. Arcanum also carried out a public relations and messaging campaign 
which resulted in front page media placements in major publications around the world. These 
included the Wall Street Journal, Financial Times, New York Times, Washington Post, RIA-
Novosti, Ynet (Israel), Associated Press, Agence France Presse, and Reuters.’[8] 
Although repackaged op-eds do ensure that a government’s views are disseminated, they gain 
more credibility if they can be backed by an independent source, such as a respected civil 
society or non-governmental organisation. Leaked emails published by the Le Temps 
newspaper in Geneva appear to show a PR campaign proposed to the Kazakh Ministry of 
Justice, which involved funding an ‘independent’ report by a European anti-corruption NGO.[9] 
The Kazakh government has also funded Western think-tanks and universities. Via the 
lobbying firm APCO, it funded three reports on Kazakhstan by the Central Asia-Caucasus 
Institute at Johns Hopkins University. Although CACI insisted that they had full editorial 
control over the reports, the resulting papers appear likely to have been viewed positively in 
Astana.[10] 
Kazakhstan has also been active in funding its own civil-society type organisations abroad. 
Many governments do fund foreign policy research institutes, but reputable think-tanks offer 
the prospect of research and advocacy that has some independence from government views. 
For example, the European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR) is an independent -think-
tank that embraces a plurality of opinions. The Brussels-based Eurasian Council on Foreign 
Affairs (ECFA) may sound similar, but it is a very different beast.[11] It mimics the form and 
activity of a think-tank – it publishes papers, hosts workshops and has a board of directors that 
includes senior European politicians such as former EU External Affairs Commissioner Benita 
Ferrero-Waldner and former UK foreign minister Jack Straw. In reality, however, it is funded 
by the government of Kazakhstan, and the views and opinions expressed by its representatives 
hardly differ from the official views of the government in Astana.[12] The ECFA is just one of 
many mimicking civil society organisations that appear to have the form of think-tanks and 
civil society organisations, but are actually acting as conduits for the thinking of post-Soviet 
authoritarian governments. The European Azerbaijan Society (TEAS) plays a similar role. 
Although it appears to be an independent organisation, designed to promote good relations 
between Azerbaijan and Europe, in practice it is little more than a lobbying organisation, run 
by PR experts.[13] 
A similar mode of mimicry is at work around elections in post-Soviet autocracies. Legitimate 
international election monitoring bodies, such as the OSCE’s ODIHR, have strongly criticised 
elections in countries such as Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan or Uzbekistan. However, to try to reduce 
the influence of these critics, authoritarian governments have invited alternative election 
observers to legitimise their flawed polls. Some of these so called ‘zombie monitors’ come 
from the Russian-led Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) or similar organizations.[14] 
But others are Western politicians or academics, willing to whitewash accounts of elections, 
however undemocratic the polls may be. Most importantly, it is these voices that are quoted in 
local media to impress domestic audiences. For example, at parliamentary elections in 
Kazakhstan in 2015, where official observers from the OSCE/ODIHR team saw ‘serious 
procedural errors and irregularities’, observers invited by the government from Britain, 
Lithuania, Norway, Austria and Bosnia-Herzegovina gave positive accounts of the election at 
a press conference held even before the polls closed.[15] 
At parliamentary elections in Azerbaijan in November 2015, the OSCE/ODIHR cancelled its 
monitoring mission after the government imposed restrictions on the number of observers it 
could deploy. Instead, the regime drafted in its own selection of some 500 ‘monitors’, including 
foreign businesspeople and parliamentarians with favourable views of the government, and 
members of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE).[16] The conclusions 
of these observers were used in the domestic press to legitimise the election.[17] For example, 
under the headline, ‘UK House of Lords: Azerbaijan ensures transparent parliamentary 
election’ Azerbaijani media reported praise for the elections from British parliamentarians Lord 
Evans and Baroness O’Cathain.[18] Baroness O’Cathain’s visit was arranged through the All-
Party Parliamentary Group on Azerbaijan, with air fares and hotel paid for by the Azerbaijan 
embassy in London.[19] Such an arrangement is not unusual: APPGs are useful mechanisms for 
lobbying; in a number of cases governments have provided administrative support to the groups 
and organised country visits.[20] The European Azerbaijan Society (TEAS) even acts as the 
secretariat for the APPG on Azerbaijan.[21] 
Even the most authoritarian regimes can find unofficial election observers to boost the 
government narrative in this way. In Uzbekistan, one of the most repressive states in the world, 
elections are notoriously undemocratic. The OSCE/ODIHR’s report on the 4 December 2016 
presidential election concluded that ‘The legal framework is not conducive to holding 
democratic elections’ and noted that ‘limits on fundamental freedoms undermine political 
pluralism and led to a campaign devoid of genuine competition.’[22] However, the Uzbek 
government invited European politicians to monitor and report positively on the poll.[23] This 
has been the pattern at previous elections. Following parliamentary elections in April 2015, 
British academics and businesspeople who had acted as government-approved ‘observers’ 
provided positive accounts of the poll at an Uzbek embassy press conference.[24] 
The information battle has been particularly fraught over events of state violence and 
repression, such as the killing of hundreds of civilians in Andijan in May 2005. International 
organisations, such as Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch, claimed that Uzbek 
government forces were involved in a massacre of civilians.[25] The Uzbek government 
described the events as an externally-backed terrorist attack, in which those who died were the 
victims of Islamist terrorists.[26] A government video of the events was presented at the 
Carnegie Center in Washington DC. Although the hosts attempted to be even-handed, the 
summary suggested that ‘The film…does not decisively answer whether the use of force, and 
more specifically its timing was justified’.[27] This ambivalent conclusion was at odds with the 
sharp condemnation of the Andijan violence by groups such as Amnesty International, which 
described the violence as ‘a mass killing of civilians’.[28] More than a decade later, the 
interpretation of the Andijan events remains contested. While human rights groups continue to 
call for accountability for the killings more than 10 years after the events, the Uzbek 
government has rejected any criticism. They have received partial support from sympathetic 
Western analysts, who have argued that the Andijan incident ‘was not a massacre’[29] and 
criticised Western media for ‘jumping to judgement’ against the Uzbek government.[30] 
Disputes over the nature of events and the appropriate responses are entirely legitimate. Yet, 
in cases such as Andijan, authoritarian governments have been able to use accounts by Western 
academics and analysts to discredit critical accounts of contested events and bolster support for 
government narratives. 
The new battlefield for the modern authoritarian state is digital. Sites such as Facebook or its 
Russian equivalent Vkontakte are hugely popular across the former Soviet Union. Enthusiasm 
has waned for the idea of social media as a potentially revolutionary technology, which would 
challenge authoritarian control over the free flow of information. Although social media allows 
news and online discussions to circulate relatively freely, authoritarian states have become 
increasingly sophisticated in their responses. States still use so-called ‘first generation’ 
controls, such as blocking websites or closing down access to the Internet:[31] Azerbaijan has 
been particularly repressive in its response to bloggers.[32] But states have increasingly turned 
to new legislation and the courts to limit digital activism, both domestically and internationally. 
The Kazakh government attempted to use US courts to attack the opposition Respublika 
website, after it published leaked emails.[33] In a series of court cases, Kazakhstan used the US 
Computer Fraud and Abuse Act to mount a campaign through international courts to close the 
newspaper’s website and harass its editors and contributors. Although Kazakhstan ultimately 
failed to win the case, the pressure group EFF argued that the US statute was ‘deeply flawed’ 
and highlighted the danger that repressive governments may use anti-hacking and computer 
fraud legislation to suppress legitimate journalism internationally.[34] 
Governments also use social media to track and control individual dissidents or to monitor 
possible anti-government protests or demonstrations.[35] In this way, social media offers a 
highly effective mechanism of mass surveillance. According to a report by Privacy 
International in 2014, ‘Central Asian governments use electronic surveillance technology to 
spy on activists and journalists in the country, and exiles abroad’. Israeli companies have 
reportedly provided extensive technological support.[36] A detailed report by EFF also claimed 
that the Kazakh authorities may have hacked accounts of political opponents in exile.[37] 
The next step for authoritarian regimes is to use social media as a platform for their own 
propaganda, using their own social media sites or – more effectively – encouraging 
independent bloggers and activists to support government policies. Sometimes, they are 
successful. A tour of popular bloggers in Kazakhstan to the town of Zhanaozen, immediately 
after 14 protestors were shot dead by police in December 2011, provided support for important 
parts of the government narrative.[38] By ensuring that ‘independent’ bloggers and activists 
circulate aspects of a government narrative, the message gains more credibility with a wider 
public. Government officials have even taken to Twitter and Facebook to plug their own 
policies. Sometimes this digital activism backfires: news reports linked the demotion of former 
Kazakh Prime Minister Karim Massimov to his over-active use of Twitter.[39] However, there 
is a gradual shift from governments simply trying to block social media to finding creative 
ways of using it to promote their own message and delegitimise opponents. 
Conclusion 
Post-Soviet states have sometimes rightly complained about biases and gaps in international 
reporting. However, in most cases, their intervention in the international information space has 
sought to suppress legitimate criticism, discredit political opponents, and boost their own 
propaganda. Too often, Western politicians, PR companies, analysts and academics have been 
only too willing to play along in this discursive game. As some PR professionals have argued, 
there needs to be far more caution about PR companies working for authoritarian 
governments.[40] Western parliamentarians and academics should think twice about becoming 
involved in election monitoring initiatives outside the agreed channels of the OSCE or signing 
up to support ‘think-tanks’ or other organisations funded by authoritarian regimes. Instead, 
more support should be offered for better media coverage and collaborative academic research 
on the region, together with genuine debates in civil society to both find common ground in 
the information battle and to maintain space for more critical views to flourish. 
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